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Regulatory reform in an emerging stock
market: the case of Hong Kong,
1945–86
CATHERINE R.  SCHENK
University of Glasgow
By the end of the twentieth century, Hong Kong was widely recognised as one of
the world’s top five international financial centres. This status is usually attributed
to the growth in global financial services from the 1970s, the acceleration of the
East Asian ‘miracle economies’ at the same time and the opening of China to
international trade and financial relations from 1978. Even in the 1960s, however,
the banking sector of Hong Kong was the third largest in the world measured by the
number of foreign bank branches, and the territory’s banking activity is still the main
source of its global status. The share market, in contrast, ranked only tenth in
the world by market capitalisation in 2002. While international banks flocked to
Hong Kong from the 1960s, the equity market was relatively underdeveloped.
Historically, share trading had developed during the same period in the late
nineteenth century as the banking system, but it failed to take a commanding
position in the post-war growth in financial services. Instead, in common with
emerging stock markets in Asia and elsewhere, the Hong Kong exchange tended to
be used as a speculative outlet for both small and large investors. This led to wide
fluctuations in prices throughout the post-war years. This paper explores how the
uneven development of the regulatory environment contributed to the relatively
weak and volatile nature of the stock exchange in Hong Kong.
Some features of the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong in the mid 1990s were
already apparent in the 1960s. Property prices were highly influential, trading tended
to be concentrated in a few shares, and manufacturing was not well represented
among the companies quoted on the market. This meant that the stock market was
susceptible to speculation because prices were tightly correlated to fluctuations in
property prices in a way that exaggerated the impact of cyclical trends.1 The small
role played by equity markets in the industrialisation of Hong Kong also reflected
the colony’s industrial structure, which was based on small and medium-sized
1 L. C. Chau, ‘Foreign investment in the Hong Kong stock market’, in Foreign Investment in Asian Stock
Markets, United Nations (1996), pp. 19–21.
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enterprises that resisted issuing equity because of a preference for family control.
Furthermore, Hong Kong was unusually heavily banked for a developing economy
with 86 licensed banks and 301 bank offices in 1965. Bank deposits as a proportion of
GDP increased from 41 per cent in 1959 to 70 per cent by 1964. Bank credit was
thus a ready alternative to equity finance for medium- and larger-scale industry.2
The scope for the equity market might therefore have been constrained by
Hong Kong’s industrial organisation and the competitiveness of the banking
system. Alternatively, the inadequacies of the equity market might have deterred
manufacturers from using it as a source of capital.
Hong Kong has traditionally been viewed as a laissez-faire paradise for inter-
national finance. Certainly, the government made only reluctant and often limited
interventions in the financial system until the mid 1960s. After this time, however,
the state became increasingly active, regulating the banking system by introducing
legislation aimed at preventing lending to companies in which directors had
an interest, ensuring a diversified portfolio of assets and trying to consolidate
the industry through a moratorium on new bank licences from 1965–72. Prudential
supervision was also gradually built up, beginning with mandatory monthly
reporting to a new banking commissioner from 1965. Interest rates, however, were
left to self-regulation. While there were periodic limited crises caused mainly by the
collapse of small banks, this combination of self-regulation and state regulation
created over time a robust banking system.3
The stock exchange, in contrast, was characterised by self-regulation for much
longer than the banking system. This article explores why the state’s attitude to the
equity market differed from that of the banking system and how this attitude
affected the functioning of the market. The pattern of self-regulation, followed by
crisis and then state intervention was evident in both the stock exchange and in the
banking system, but the government was quicker to act in the latter case. The softer
attitude of the government to the stock market can be explained by both ideological
and practical considerations. Part of the answer lies in the different attitudes of
the players in the market. The enthusiasm for reform from brokers was negatively
correlated to the level of activity in the market and they strongly resisted govern-
ment efforts to intervene, while the largest banks were consistently in favour of
greater state regulation in their sector. Also, the need for the state to protect the
consumer was seen as less pressing for the stock market than was the case for bank-
ing, which was considered a necessary part of saving and financial intermediation.
The stock exchange, by contrast, was considered essentially a playground for the
2 C. R. Schenk, ‘Finance of Industry in Hong Kong 1950–70: a case of market failure?’ Business History
(forthcoming, 2004).
3 For bank regulation see C. R. Schenk, ‘Banking crises and the development of bank regulation in
Hong Kong’, Australian Economic History Review, 44 (2004) and C. R. Schenk, Hong Kong as an
International Financial Centre (London, 2001), ch. 3.
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wealthy and it was only when the boom of 1972/3 drew in a wide spectrum
of the population that the state considered intervening. However, the process was
uneven and delivered mixed results that left the system vulnerable to corruption.
Regulation of new issues and share trading, and the costs that governments face
when enforcing regulations are issues that plague all active equity markets. In the
post-war decades the London Stock Exchange, for example, also wrestled with the
balance between self-regulation and government intervention, and with unification
of various exchanges. The LSE operated an elaborate and effective system of
self-regulation that forestalled government intervention, but the market was still
susceptible to the failures of non-members. Moreover, R. C. Michie argues that, by
the 1980s, the rules set by the LSE ‘gradually stopped Stock Exchange members
evolving in ways best suited to meet the needs of the investors they served and
the markets they operated in’.4 Self-regulation can thus be as stultifying as external
regulation. In 1985 the UK government tried to resolve the tension between
external and internal supervision by setting up a Securities Investment Board that
included several officially sanctioned self-regulatory organisations. To some extent,
therefore, Hong Kong was merely sharing the difficult path of other financial
centres. The case of Hong Kong, however, also exhibits problems common in other
emerging markets. Rules only developed after the volume of trading had accelerated
on the basis of a small number of listings closely linked to other speculative asset
markets. Practices of self-regulation that had developed over many decades in
centres such as London had to be created much more quickly, and this pace
provided opportunities for moral hazard. In Hong Kong, there were only limited
internal checks and balances until the 1970s: there was inadequate disclosure on
prospectuses for new companies, no limits on insider trading, no separation of
jobbers and brokers, and brokers were free to trade on their own account as well as
for their customers.
I
Share trading began in Hong Kong after the first Companies Ordinance of 1865, and
was brought into an organised stock exchange in the mid 1880s.5 By the start of the
Second World War there were two exchanges; the Hong Kong Stock Exchange,
and the Hong Kong Shareholders Association. Some trading took place during the
war, and resumed unofficially soon after the Japanese surrender.6 However, demand
was low, the number of brokers was drastically reduced, and prices fluctuated widely
on the black market, destroying investor confidence.
4 R. C. Michie, The London Stock Exchange; a History (Oxford, 1999), p. 559.
5 Parts of this section draw on Schenk, Hong Kong, pp. 107–14.
6 Interview with Mr Francis R. Zimmern, member of the HKSE from its inception and chairman
1972–7, 14 November 1996. Hong Kong Stock Market History Project, Centre for Asian Studies,
University of Hong Kong.
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Before the war there was no regulation of the activities of share brokers and when
the reopening of the markets was proposed, the Hongkong Bank approached
the government to suggest that rules and regulations be introduced to govern the
market.7 In July 1945, J. H.Taggart in Hong Kong asserted that self-regulation had
not been effective before the war, with members contravening the rules of
the exchanges with impunity. A second problem was the ‘lack of discrimination
displayed in affording entree to a galaxy of impecunious and irresponsible individu-
als of decidedly questionable character’. He also alleged that brokers ‘forced
themselves on the Boards’ of several companies and used the insider information
they gained to profit personally. A third issue was that brokers traded on their own
account as well as on behalf of their customers. These activities undermined the
effectiveness of the equity market as a source of capital and as a sound investment for
individuals. Moreover, shares changed hands informally without reregistration of
the owner in order to evade stamp duty.
Morse passed Taggart’s ideas on to D. M. MacDougall of the Hong Kong
Planning Unit in London. At this time, however, the government had other
pressing business associated with the reoccupation of the colony and the question of
regulating the stock exchange was set aside. The postponement was also due to
reluctance on the part of the Hong Kong government to intervene directly. In the
view of N. L. Smith of the Hong Kong government, it was difficult for them
to enforce ethical standards. This might be better done, he argued, through a
professional institute or council rather than by regulation, although he agreed
that ‘I think there must exist some legal powers of control.’8 This established
self-regulation as the preferred regime.
To consolidate the market, the government and the exchanges decided in
November 1946 to fulfil plans made in October 1939 to merge the two exchanges
into the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (1947) Ltd. (hereafter HKSE), which opened
for business in February 1947. Twenty-two dealers, predominantly Hong Kong
Chinese, made up the initial membership of the new exchange, although there was
provision for 60 members. By April the number had reached 54 brokers, with four
applications pending. Brokers were required to be of British nationality or able to
prove that they had resided in Hong Kong for at least five years. This allowed entry
to British brokers from Shanghai but not to mainland Chinese brokers. Members
continued to trade both for their clients and on their own accounts.
Brokerage commission was first set at 1 per cent of the gross value of the transac-
tion, where it remained throughout the 1950s, except for a brief spell at 0.5 per cent
during an increase in activity in the market from mid November 1947 until May
1948. Profits were not subject to capital gains tax, but transactions were subject to an
7 Letter from J. H. Taggart to Arthur Morse (HSBC), 8 July 1945. Public Records Office, Hong Kong
(hereafter HKRS) 211/2/22.
8 Manuscript memo by N. L. Smith, 17 August 1945. HKRS 211/2/22.
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ad valorem stamp duty of 0.2%, bringing the total cost of trading to 1.2 per cent.
Prices were chalked up on large wooden trading boards where bid and offer prices
were quoted on a ‘first come first served’ basis.
The atmosphere was frequently described as being like a gentlemen’s club. A
prominent broker at the time, Francis Zimmern, described how there was a bar for
members and they could drink and eat in the trading hall. During periods of dull
trading, brokers would play dice or escape the hall for a round of golf, particularly
when the exchange was closed for trading on Wednesday afternoons to allow clerks
to catch up on paperwork. This relaxed and cosy atmosphere reflected shallow
trading and narrow markets.9
Figure 1 shows the amount of new capital raised on the HKSE. The listings were
dominated by large enterprises, primarily located in the service sector rather than
manufacturing, despite this being a period of rapid textile-based industrialisation in
Hong Kong. Of the capital raised between 1958 and 1966, 43 per cent was by public
utilities and a further 15 per cent by hotel, property and commercial enterprises.
From 1954–65 just over HK$760 million of new capital was raised on the stock
exchange. This compared with HK$4.9 billion in 1966–72.10 From 1959–68 capital
raised through the stock exchange amounted to less than 1 per cent of GDP. The
stock exchange was not an important source of capital formation for Hong Kong’s
post-war industrialisation.
9 Interview with Zimmern.
10 Y. C. Jao, Banking and Currency in Hong Kong (London, 1974), p. 88.
Figure 1. New capital raised on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange
Source: Y.C. Jao, Banking and Currency in Hong Kong (London, 1974).
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Table 1 shows the number of companies listed in Hong Kong. Between 1957 and
1965, 19 new companies were listed and one insurance company was removed after
it was taken over by a British firm. By the mid 1960s there was active trading in only
25 companies, with periodic trading in a further ten shares.
The narrowness of the Hong Kong market in this period can be attributed partly
to the predominance of small family firms that depended primarily on internal funds
or ‘friendly’ loans.11 A further restriction on activity was that high unit prices for
many shares tended to exclude all but the wealthy from participating in the stock
market. In the 1940s, many investors were Chinese owners or managers of local
banks, and brokers visited them daily to encourage business and deliver certificates.12
In the 1950s, a few individuals such as George Marden (of Wheelock Marden and
Co. Ltd), and Noel Croucher (a prosperous broker) had a large influence on the
market.13 Shares traded well above their par value, and were usually transferable only
in collective ‘boards’ of minimum numbers.14 For example, Hongkong Bank shares
Table 1. Companies listed on the HKSE, 1957 and 1967
Number of companies
Industry group 1957 1967
Banking and finance 2 2
Insurance 3 2
Investment 3 4
Shipping 4 5
Other commercial 1 4
Docks and wharves 4 6
Utilities 5 8
Textiles 9 12
Other industrial 2 4
Stores 4 5
Miscellaneous 5 8
Rubber 4 4
Others 5 5
Total 51 69
Source: K. A. Wong, ‘The Stock Market in Hong Kong: a Study of its Functions and
Efficiency’, Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Liverpool, 1975, p. 90.
11 Report of the Industrial Bank Committee (Hong Kong, 1960), p. 5.
12 Interview with Zimmern.
13 Shares in Hong Kong, Hong Kong Stock Exchange, pp. 55–6.
14 The ‘Sticking List’ which set the negotiable amount of shares for each listing was published in the
Far Eastern Economic Review (hereafter FEER), 16 April 1947, p. 189.
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with a par value of $HK125 traded at over $HK1,450 (£90) in March 1961. At this
point the shares were split in order to increase the popularity of the stock. By the end
of the year, however, the price of these split shares had increased from $HK209 to
$HK450.15
Figure 2 shows the monthly turnover on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange from
1949–66. Due to the relatively small number of new issues, the narrow range of
investors in the 1950s, and the small number of public companies, the value
of transactions on the market was fairly low until the boom of 1959–61.
The first post-war stock market ‘boom’ began in October 1959, partly due to
inflows of capital from overseas. Investors were attracted to the shares of companies
with large land holdings because property values had soared in the wake of local and
overseas speculation. At the same time, the revival of international trade benefited
the share value of banks and shipping companies.16 The Hongkong Bank raised its
overdraft rates for stockbrokers and borrowers against shares by 1 per cent in an
effort to try to stem the speculation, but this had only a temporary dampening effect
and turnover on the market recovered by February 1960. The monthly value of
stock turnover reached its highest level in March 1961 at $HK219 million. Share
prices on average doubled between 1959 and mid 1961, bringing dividend yields to
15 ‘Stock Market Report’, Hong Kong Exporter (1962), pp. 89–93.
16 Ibid.
Figure 2. Hong Kong Stock Exchange monthly turnover 1949–66
Source: HKSE Weekly Share Report.
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levels similar to those of the US and Britain.17 By June 1961 the cost of a seat on the
HKSE had quadrupled to HK$200,000 (£12,500).18
 In June 1961, the boom was halted by the failure of a local bank and by credit
restrictions imposed to halt speculation. An official enquiry into the provision
of electricity in the Colony recommended a merger of the two electric power
companies, delivering a ‘paralysing blow to confidence’ to the market, knocking
hundreds of millions of dollars off the value of utility shares within one week.19 By
August, market turnover had fallen to one quarter of the March value. Continued
uncertainty about whether the government would adopt the enquiry’s proposals,
and periodic international political disturbances (including the Cuban missile crisis)
depressed the market from mid 1962 until 1964. Once the utilities policy was
resolved, the market recovered, but it was then struck by the banking crisis of 1965.
The Far Eastern Economic Review constructed an index of share prices based on the
market value of shares of 20 prominent listed companies in August 1962.20 Figure 3
shows the movements in this index from 1962–65. This shows the stagnation in
prices during 1963 until the market recovered from the uncertainty described above.
The banking crisis of April/May 1965 then resulted in a fall in prices to below the
levels reached three years earlier.
17 K. A. Wong, ‘The Stock Market in Hong Kong; a Study of its Functions and Efficiency’,
(Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Liverpool, 1975), pp. 83–4.
18 Shares in Hong Kong, HKSE, pp. 57–8.
19 Nigel Ruscoe’s Annual Hong Kong Register, 1963, p. 207.
20 For a list of the companies see FEER, 3 January 1963, p. 43.
Figure 3. Far Eastern Economic Review share index, 3 August 1962 = 100
Source: Far Eastern Economic Review.
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In summary, the HKSE was forged in an environment of lax regulatory control
reinforced by low turnover. The market was not an important contributor to capital
formation, particularly for industry. Indeed, for 1959–64, the amount of new
capital raised as a proportion of GDP was only about half that of the UK, USA
and European stock markets. Moreover, from the early 1960s it was already apparent
that the market was vulnerable to a variety of influences including fluctuations
in property values, speculative momentum, local and international interest rates, and
flows of capital in and out of the Colony. The government was not interested
in intervening, however, as the market tended to be dominated by wealthy local
investors and foreign capital. This profile was to change profoundly in the next
decade.
I I
A new era began in the late 1960s. Political agitation in the summer of 1967, associ-
ated with the Cultural Revolution in China, provided the second major shock to
the market. Hong Kong communists organised a series of protests and riots that
seemed to threaten the colonial integrity of Hong Kong. The exchange sought
support from the government and large banks to sustain market prices but this was
refused. Instead, trading was suspended for three weeks to prevent panic selling.
With the successful confrontation of the communist agitators by the end of the year,
however, political stability returned and in 1968 the market began to climb. The
nominal value of turnover tripled from HK$305m in 1967 to HK$944m in 1968.
This surge attracted a flood of new issues and rights issues of existing companies that
totalled HK$321m in 1969, compared with only HK$29m in 1968.21
In this atmosphere of boom, with considerable profits to be made, Ronald Fook
Shiu Li approached the HKSE and requested that the number of seats be increased to
allow new entrants, but he was refused. In his frustration, Li and his associates
decided to open their own exchange that would better serve the local Chinese
community. It traded in smaller lots and used Cantonese as the lingua franca.
Li, himself, had a reputation as a successful property developer as well as close
connections in banking and financial circles, coming as he did from one of the most
distinguished financial and business families in Hong Kong. He was the nephew of
one of the founding members of the Bank of East Asia (the largest Hong Kong
Chinese controlled bank in Hong Kong in the 1950s) and was a cousin of the
chairman of the bank in the 1960s. The Bank of East Asia was famously conservative
in its policy but Ronald Li seems to have been a more entrepreneurial character,
having bought his first shares at age six in Hong Kong Electric and described by one
of his relatives to the press as ‘flashy’.22
21 Jao, Banking and Currency.
22 FEER, 28 March 1975.
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The Far East Exchange (FEE) was planned with 34 seats available at an initial cost
of $HK80,000, compared to $HK250,000 for a seat on the HKSE. In addition, 15
seats were reserved for the founders taking the total to 49. Some of the brokers were
former members or runners for the HKSE. The response of the HKSE was initially
hostile and brokers were not allowed to be members of more than one exchange,
despite the fact that they traded in many of the same shares. The goal of the FEE, as
reported in the press, was to encourage more new issues to broaden the range of
shares available on the market as well as drawing in a wider range of investors. Li
noted in 1975 that ‘[T]he old exchange was run like a club for the rich. I had an idea
it could be popularised so the ordinary citizen could participate in the growth of the
economy.’23 He also asserted that companies were reluctant to go public because of
the slowness of the HKSE in responding to applications.24
The new FEE at first did not comply with the conditions for recognising a stock
exchange under the Companies Ordinance for 1970, but it was allowed to trade in
the interim. The Ordinance required a compensation fund to be held against the risk
of members in default. It also included a series of provisions to ensure transparency;
that records of transactions be open to the public for a fee; that details of prospectuses
should be disclosed, as well as the interests of a director of the FEE in any company
to be listed. Li first applied for recognition in May 1970 but was only allowed
interim recognition that was extended at three-month intervals until he had fully
complied.25 Finally, in September 1971, Haddon-Cave, the financial secretary,
wrote to Li asking formally for assurance that the committee of the FEE were
satisfied that their members abided by the rules. Li confirmed that members
themselves were not trading on the margin, but that he could not vouch for
their customers. 26 This satisfied the financial secretary and the FEE was officially
recognized from the end of January 1971, over a year after it had started trading.
The establishment of the FEE challenged the gentleman’s club atmosphere of the
HKSE and was quickly followed by other exchanges.27 At the beginning of 1970 the
FEE asked the Gold and Silver Exchange to join, but they decided in May 1970 to
open their own exchange, the Kam Ngan Stock Exchange (KNE), which started
trading in the Tai Sang Bank Building in 1971.28 The Kowloon Stock Exchange
23 Quoted in FEER, 28 March 1975.
24 FEER, 27 Nov 1969.
25 Letter from financial secretary to the FEE, 29 April 1970, 9 January 1971, 30 March 1971. Archive
of the Far East Exchange, University of Hong Kong (hereafter FEE) Box 32/1.
26 Haddon-Cave to FEE, 13 September 1971. Reply from Li to Haddon-Cave 17 September 1971.
Reply from Haddon-Cave to Li, 21 October 1971. FEE Box 32/1.
27 The FEE and the KNE also broke with HKSE tradition by allowing women brokers to become
members. FEER 25 December 1971.
28 Minutes of the General Committee Meetings FEE, 28 January 1970 and 4 March 1970. FEE Box
81/4. For an account of the Gold and Silver Exchange see C. R. Schenk, ‘The Hong Kong gold
market and the Southeast Asian gold trade in the 1950s’, Modern Asian Studies, 29 (1995),
pp. 387–402.
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(KSE) followed in January 1972 with 156 members and began trading in the shares
of 99 companies. As well as trading the shares of the main bank and land companies,
it specialised in listing smaller local companies and corporate shells, many of which
could not meet the listing requirements on the other exchanges. It claimed to be the
first exchange to use computers to generate daily reports and produce invoices.29
Despite its name it was not located in the manufacturing centre of Kowloon but at
Queens’ Road Central in the financial district on Hong Kong Island near the other
exchanges.
In February 1973 the government rushed through legislation preventing trading
outside existing exchanges for fear that excessive competition in the market would
be destabilising. Competition among the exchanges pushed brokers fees down when
the market was sluggish and they were as low as 0.12-per cent on some share issues
even before the KSE opened.30 The KSE generally charged 0.25 per cent brokerage
compared with the 0.5 per cent on most issues by the FEE and HKSE. They also
charged less for a seat; $50,000 compared with $80,000 for the FEE. This raised fears
that brokers would not be making sufficient money from their activities, might be
driven to take excessive risks on their own account, and that they might be easily
bankrupted.31 The threat was accentuated in Hong Kong because there were
no rules for the proportion of a placement that needed to be sold to the public.
Brokers could thus retain all of their portion of a new issue in order to reap the
profits of subsequent post-issue price rises. The government certainly believed that
competition between the exchanges undermined standards of listing and trading.32
The FEE was immediately successful, suggesting there was indeed a pent-up
demand for shares and desire among companies to go public. At the end of 1969, 75
companies were listed on the FEE. In 1971, 65 new listings appeared on the FEE and
a further 56 the following year.33 In 1971, the FEE accounted for only 23 per cent of
the number of new listings, but this increased to 66 per cent in 1972 and 49 per cent
in 1973.34 The FEE was thus leading the new issues boom. Hang Lung Develop-
ment Company was the first to apply for a simultaneous IPO on the HKSE, FEE and
KNE in September 1972. The number of employees of the FEE increased from 14
in 1970 to 35 by 1973.
By the end of the boom in mid 1973 nearly 1000 brokers were active in the four
markets, representing one broker for each 4000 of Hong Kong’s residents. Table 2
shows the increase in membership of the exchanges during the boom. In 1973 the
KNE doubled its accommodation to meet the needs of its 350 members by moving
to a 14,000-square-foot hall in central Hong Kong.35
29 The Kowloon Stock Exchange Limited, 1972.
30 FEER, 13 November 1971.
31 FEER, 25 December 1971.
32 View of the securities commissioner, Uisdein Innes, reported in the FEER, 13 June 1980.
33 Far East Exchange Ltd Yearbook, 1979.
34 Far East Exchange Ltd Yearbook, 1973.
35 Kam Ngan Stock Exchange Ltd, 10th Anniversary 1971–1980.
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As in the early 1960s, the stock market boom of 1972–3 was driven by rising
property prices. Companies engaged in property development or with substantial
land such as docks, wharves and godowns experienced the greatest surge in prices
during the boom. Figure 4 shows the classified index for the FEE with April
1971 = 1000. Land and construction prices rose the most, although docks, invest-
ment companies and commercial/industrial companies all outperformed the index
as a whole.36 The vulnerability of the stock exchange to volatility in the property
Table 2. Number of members of the exchanges, 1972 and 1973
Mid 1972 Mid 1973
HKSE 71 129
FEE 198 341
KNE 91 350
KSE 156 171
Total 516 991
Source: Wong, ‘Stock Market in Hong Kong’, p. 362.
Figure 4. Far East Exchange classified price index
Source: FEE Annual Reports.
36 The commercial/industrial index was comprised of the major merchant hongs such as Jardines,
Hutchison, Swire Pacific and Wheelock as well as GI Cement, San Miguel, Lap Heng, Stelux
and Zung Fu. ‘Investments’ included four investment companies. ‘Land and construction’ included
13 companies.
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market continued throughout the exchanges’ history. In 1995 about 50 per cent of
the capitalisation of the local stock market was based on real estate.37
Land and construction companies comprised 14 out of the total of 80 companies
listed on the FEE in 1971 (17.5 per cent), but this increased to 97 out of a total of
216 companies by the end of 1973 (45 per cent). The volume of turnover on the
FEE was dominated by activity in this category of shares, which accounted for over
40 per cent of total turnover by volume from 1972–6, peaking during the boom at
62.2 per cent of volume. By value, however, property’s share was considerably
smaller as is shown in Table 3, which presents the two most active categories of
shares by value and volume. These two categories accounted for over 60 per cent of
turnover by volume and over 50 per cent by value. Unit costs for property shares
were considerably lower than for commercial and industrial shares, suggesting that
they appealed to the small speculator.
The speculative role of property in the boom is also clear in comparison of issue
and market valuation. After the end of the boom, the market value of land and
construction companies had fallen below the value of issued capital.
The new issues were designed specifically to appeal to the small investor. Of the
42 new listings on the FEE in the first 11 months of 1972, only one (Hang Seng
Bank $HK100) had an offer price above $HK8 per share and half had an offer price
of $HK1. Sixteen of these new issues were real-estate or property-development
concerns. The market capitalisation of these 42 new listings was 75 per cent higher
than the offer price by November 1972.38 This pulled in other borrowers that hoped
to cash in on the rising market. Barrie and Tricker note an example of the Hong
Kong Backfire Loop Antenna Co. launched in 1972 on the KSE based on the sole
asset of a patent on a TV aerial. The shares ‘quickly shot up to 20 times their issue
37 Chau, ‘Foreign investment’, p. 19.
38 Far East Exchange Ltd Yearbook, 1972.
Table 3. Shares of the total turnover on the Far East Exchange, by sector, 1971–6
Land and construction Commercial and industrial
Per cent of total Volume Value Volume Value
1971 37.7 17.9 20.8 32.4
1972 41.3 26.5 15.0 31.6
1973 62.2 40.0 12.8 24.6
1974 43.8 26.4 25.5 32.0
1975 44.6 24.9 26.9 31.4
1976 42.5 26.6 19.5 25.6
Average 45.3 27.1 20.1 29.6
Source: Far East Exchange Ltd Yearbook, various issues.
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price’. Other examples included investment groups with very limited owned
assets.39 Ronald Li countered such criticism by claiming in 1972 that new companies
listing on the FEE had assets that amounted on average to 94.6 per cent of issued
price.40 In December 1972 the Companies Ordinance was amended to require
better disclosure on prospectuses.41
The share boom had repercussions in the banking sector. Bank loans to stock
brokers increased sharply from $38m in March 1969 to $736m by the end of 1972,
representing a growth in the share of total bank lending from 0.5 per cent to over
4 per cent. This increased commitment made banks nervous and, at the beginning of
1973, loans were called in, interest rates were increased, and the value of loans to
stockbrokers fell back to 2.7 per cent of total loans by March 1973. The banks also
took part directly in the boom. As noted above, in June 1972 Hang Seng Bank
issued 100m shares at $100 each, which were 29 times oversubscribed and closed the
day at $165. During the boom, bank shares had the highest ratio of market value to
issued capital, peaking at 14:1 in 1972.
The boom was accompanied by an influx of merchant banks. In 1972, for
example, James Slater of Slater Walker arrived from Singapore and ‘set the market
alight with a hectic series of deals’.42 The Government had imposed a moratorium
on new bank licenses from 1965, which was made official in 1967 and maintained
until 1978 except for a brief hiatus in 1972–5 when Barclays Bank alone was allowed
to enter. To evade the moratorium, over 2,000 local and overseas non-banking
financial institutions opened to meet the demand for the services of merchant banks
and finance companies. These so-called Deposit-Taking Companies did not come
under the Banking Ordinance nor the self-regulatory interest rate agreement of
commercial banks. The DTCs were left unregulated until a new Ordinance was
enacted in 1976, after which their number dropped dramatically.43
The stock market boom was ended by a combination of tighter money, the end
of the property boom, government warnings and discovery of fraudulent shares. On
11 January the Banking Commissioner asked banks to restrict loans using shares as
collateral and the market turned downward. On this day the FEE was issued a
citation by the fire officer to reduce the number of people in the exchange. In
addition to 250 brokers on the floor, there were another 100 visitors and reporters in
39 R. Barrie and G. Tricker, Shares in Hong Kong: 100 Years of Stock Exchange Trading, Stock Exchange of
Hong Kong Ltd (Hong Kong, 1991), p. 78. An almost identical account is found in A. Rowley, Asian
Stockmarkets: the Inside Story (Homewood, IL, 1987), p. 132.
40 Chairman’s Report, Far East Exchange Ltd Yearbook, 1972.
41 Wong notes that until this time ‘neither the disclosure of authorised, issued and paid-up capital was
clearly stated, nor was the disclosure of the nature of the business, the purpose of the issue, or the
consolidated accounts of an issue made by a holding company required’. Wong, ‘Stock Market’,
p. 180.
42 Barrie and Tricker, Shares in Hong Kong, p. 74.
43 For the main features of the Ordinance see T. K. Ghose, The Banking System of Hong Kong
(Singapore, 1987), pp. 80–2.
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the public gallery, contributing to the spirit of the boom.44 When the international
monetary crisis raging in the rest of the world undermined confidence further, the
stock exchanges restricted their trading to half days in February. At the end of the
month, the banks increased interest rates, further dampening the market. In March,
foreign exchange dealing was suspended in the wake of the collapse of the Bretton
Woods fixed exchange rate system, and at the same time forged shares in Hopewell
were discovered, sending shivers of fear through the market.45 The biggest daily fall
in the Far East Exchange index came on 4 April when the Inland Revenue proposed
doubling the stamp duty on share dealings from 0.2 to 0.4 per cent, sending the FEE
index down 9.7 per cent for the day (the Hang Seng Index fell 8.74 per cent). On
11 May, in order to forestall bankruptcies the FEE agreed to accept members’
applications for loans using shares for collateral, one day after the KNE had
announced the same.
Figure 5 shows price indices for three exchanges in Hong Kong and that of
London adjusted for January 1973=100. It is clear when comparing London and
Hong Kong that the surge in 1972/3 was the result of local factors. The Hang Seng
index (based on the HKSE) moved very closely with the Far East Exchange.
The Hang Seng index included 33 companies, only three of which were not
Figure 5. Monthly Stock Exchange indices, 1972–80
Source: FEE Annual Reports.
44 Citation of fire officer, 11 January 1973. FEE Box 119/1. The FEER reported that the government
had sent the firemen into the exchanges to curb speculative interest created by the crowds. FEER 19
February 1973.
45 This was followed on 20 August 1973 by the discovery of forged Hutchison shares and in September
by Lee Hing and Mei Hon and OOC forgeries.
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included in the FEE index. 46 The Far East Index included 51 companies. The Kam
Ngan index began at the start of 1973 and included 90 companies, of which 41 were
not included in either the Hang Seng or the FEE index. They also published
separate indices for ‘new’ and ‘old’ issues, believing that offering an index of ‘new’
shares provided extra information for its customers.47
Figure 6 shows that nominal turnover on the FEE peaked in 1972 while the other
exchanges peaked a year later. The Hong Kong economy remained in a slump for
three years as a result of the international economic crisis and this was reflected in the
exchanges. After the slump the KNE turnover overtook the HKSE but the KSE
never recovered from the bust of 1973. By 1975, equity trading was highly
concentrated in a few shares: the top ten traded shares in the FEE by volume
accounted for 59 per cent of total turnover. The ten most actively traded issues in
terms of value accounted for 72 per cent of total trading value.48 The ten largest
companies accounted for over half of the total market capitalisation in 1975.
In sum, the boom of 1972/3 transformed the nature of the equity market in Hong
Kong and posed new challenges. The proliferation of exchanges took place in a
rapidly rising market and itself contributed to the new issue boom. Unlike the 1960s,
the exchanges aimed new issues at the small investor and the phenomenal rise in
46 PPK Ng, executive vice chair of the FEE asked Hang Seng Bank to include the FEE in the
Hang Seng Index but this was refused on the basis that more than one index for similar stocks was
confusing to investors. See correspondence March 1970 to April 1971. FEE Box 10/6.
47 Kam Ngan Stock Exchange Ltd Yearbook, 1977.
48 Far East Exchange Yearbook, 1975.
Figure 6. Nominal turnover
Source: FEE Yearbooks.
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prices drew a wide spectrum of the population into the market. The government
made a variety of efforts to stem the boom both directly and through the banking
system, but its most decisive legal intervention was to introduce a moratorium on
new exchanges. As in the banking system, their view was that excessive competition
threatened the stability of the market by encouraging risky behaviour. The end
of the exchange as a gentleman’s club also opened the case for government
intervention to protect the public from the widely publicised abuses of the system
such as spurious floatations and fraudulent shares.
I I I
Hong Kong’s financial secretary during the 1950s and 1960s, J. J. Cowperthwaite,
was devoutly opposed to intervention in financial markets. This was particularly
evident in his approach to bank regulation, but was also the case for the stock
exchanges. Until the 1970s, the collection of stamp duty was the main intervention
in the market. He finally retired in 1971, paving the way for supervisory regulation.
In July 1971, when market trading was relatively low, the HKSE and the FEE tried
to get the stamp duty reduced.49 Because there were no jobbers in the market,
brokers were sometimes left with transactions on their own account to cover. This
arose from the delay between sales for overseas clients and arrival of the certificates,
sales where certificates ended up having more shares than the sale, or brokers being
asked to buy odd numbers of shares and having to take up the rest of the board lot
themselves. The exchanges asked for a fixed charge on such jobbers’ balances.
Secondly, they asked for a 15 per cent allowance for mistakes since in Cantonese the
word for ‘buy’ is very similar to ‘sell’. Not surprisingly, both requests were turned
down. The new financial secretary, Haddon-Cave, suggested using the Chinese
words for ‘in’ and ‘out’ instead to avoid confusion.50 In the boom in 1973 the
government doubled the stamp duty to restrain activity in the market, reducing
it again only in 1978.
As was the case for the banking sector, suppliers in the market hoped to enlist the
government to support controls on competition.51 In 1970, seven companies were
formed to trade as stock exchanges. In July 1971, the FEE and HKSE jointly asked
the government to prevent any new exchanges from actually opening, but they
were turned down.52 In August 1971 the Committee on the Reform of the
Companies Law noted the need for some kind of supervisory ‘watch dog’ for
49 Letter from P. C. Woo on behalf of Far East Stock Exchange Ltd to financial secretary 30/7/71.
HKRS 229/1/960.
50 Letter from Haddon-Cave to P. C. Woo, 17/11/71. HKRS 229/1/960.
51 On bank regulation in Hong Kong see Schenk, ‘Banking crises’.
52 Letter from P. C. Woo on behalf of Far East Stock Exchange Ltd to financial secretary 30/7/71.
HKRS. 229/1/960. The number of registered companies is from R. Fell, Crisis and Change: the
Maturing of Hong Kong’s Financial Markets, 1981–1989 (London, 1992), pp. 38–9.
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the stock market but recommended that there should not be any limit on the future
number of exchanges and urged that self-regulation should be encouraged. They
confirmed that ‘we are fully convinced that Government should not get deeply
involved in attempts to regulate and supervise stock exchanges.’53 In September, Li
suggested to the HKSE some joint action to stop the proposed fourth exchange (the
KSE) but the HKSE decided that it was not politic to go ahead.54 Noting that ‘we
have experienced enough difficulty with Government as it is’, the committee of the
HKSE decided not to go against government wishes on this matter. In their
view, another exchange would not hurt existing ones beyond the proliferation itself
damaging Hong Kong’s reputation overseas.
Instead, the HKSE suggested that a Federation of Stock Exchanges be established
along the lines of the British model to act as a self-regulating body and constrain
competition.55 The Federation would include a compensation fund, standardised
brokerage fees and working hours, and rules for the registration of brokers. It would
be chaired by each of the three exchanges in rotation. Share listings and placements
would be made on the basis of the exchange that initiated the listing getting
50–70 per cent and the others sharing the rest. The listing fee would be doubled and
shared out 50 per cent to the initiating exchange and 25 per cent to each of the
others.56 Ronald Li was initially not enthusiastic about linking the FEE to the more
conservative HKSE practices.57 However, he became more enthusiastic about
constraining competition after the fourth exchange opened. The Kowloon Stock
Exchange (KSE) closed 30 minutes later than the other exchanges, pioneered
Saturday trading and charged only HK$8850 for a broker’s seat, one-sixth of the cost
on other exchanges. By May 1972, Li was doing the running on the proposed
Federation, with the HKSE dragging its heels.58 However, the proposal lay dormant
through the market boom and bust of 1972/3 and the self-regulating Federation was
not formed until July 1974.
In the meantime, the boom in share trading prompted the government to take
more deliberate steps toward regulation. They had hoped that self-regulation would
suffice, but the dubious nature of some of the new issues and the much wider
pool of investors made the case for some government intervention to protect
investors more compelling. During the boom, it was frequently observed that even
servants were actively speculating on the market and the press regularly published
photographs of long queues of poorly dressed punters waiting to submit applications
53 Report of the Companies Law Revision Committee quoted in Fell, Crisis, p. 41.
54 Letter from A. H. Potts, chair of HKSE to R. Li, 20 September 1971. FEE Box 112/9.
55 Ibid. Michie describes the foundation of the Federation of Stock Exchanges in Great Britain
and Ireland in 1965 as an unsuccessful step toward unification of exchanges by the LSE. Michie,
London, pp. 459–60.
56 Memo for Proposed Federation of Exchanges (draft), 12 April 1972. FEE Box 112/9.
57 FEER, 30 October 1971, p. 49.
58 Minutes of a General Committee Meeting, Far East Exchange, 19 May 1972. FEE Box 10/6.
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for new issues. On 6 January 1973 the government established a Securities Advisory
Committee to recommend regulations to protect investors similar to those of the
proposed Federation, including standard brokers’ commissions, and restricted
membership of stock exchanges. There were no stock exchanges directly repre-
sented on the committee and it took nine months to produce a draft bill.
The end of the boom diminished both the market’s and the government’s deter-
mination to improve standards.59 At the end of September 1973, the government
finally published its new Securities Bill, but it was greeted with general opposition.
Peter Chan, chair of the KSE ‘claimed that brokers and exchanges should be
self-regulating and that the bill would discourage honest men from becoming
professional brokers’.60 There were complaints about the proposed fund to which
dealers were required to contribute cash to compensate investors who were misled
by stockbrokers or who incurred losses from bankruptcy. As well as compensating
investors, this fund was designed to weed out brokers without substantial means at
their disposal. In response to protests, the government agreed to cut their initial
recommendation for contributions of $HK100,000 (US$20,000) to $HK25,000 cash
plus an equal guarantee from a bank. The government also retreated on the clauses
outlawing insider trading. They were included in the bill but it was agreed that they
would not be enforced until better definitions of insider trading were available. The
draft bill banned short selling and forward trading as undesirable speculative
elements in the market, but this was removed after protests partly on behalf of
overseas investors. The Bill also recommended the establishment of a Federation
of Exchanges that would undertake some self-regulation, along the lines of the
HKSE idea.
In February 1974, the government introduced the Ordinance for the Protection
of Investors and created the post of Securities Commissioner as a watch-dog. By the
end of 1975, 1019 individual dealers (951 from the exchanges), 977 dealers’
representatives, 60 investment representatives, 79 corporate dealers and 38 corporate
investment advisors had registered with the commissioner.61 Despite the pressures
on the system exposed during the boom, however, self-regulation remained the
cornerstone of the government’s approach.
The institutional form of self-regulation was the Federation of Stock Exchanges,
which was finally created in July 1974 (more than two years after it was first
proposed) and dealt with training, research and standardisation. One of its decisions
was to prevent foreigners from becoming full members of any of the exchanges in
order to constrain competition. Overseas members were allowed only associate
membership through a local broker, but the FEE ignored this decision in 1979 and
again in 1980 by accepting overseas brokers as full members. The second time also
59 When presenting his draft proposals to R. Li, Selwyn (securities commissioner) remarked that the
need was no longer so pressing. Selwyn to Li, 17 September 1973. FEE Box 34/1.
60 FEER, 22 Oct 1973, p. 62.
61 Barrie and Tricker, Shares in Hong Kong, p. 85.
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contravened the government’s Unification Ordinance and exposed the weak
enforcement of the Federation’s guidance.62 In August 1975, the government
published the Code on Takeovers and Mergers, providing voluntary guidelines and
requirements for companies to alert shareholders to such developments. Insider
dealing was considered by a special tribunal in 1977 that decided that it should be the
responsibility of the securities commissioner to investigate suspected cases rather
than proposing more direct rules. By the end of the 1970s, therefore, the regulatory
framework was still limited and voluntary.
In summary, self-regulation remained the preferred option for the government.
As in the case of the banking legislation of 1965, the draft securities bill was consid-
erably weakened as a result of negotiation with those who were to be regulated. The
government did not feel it was possible to impose regulations on the market without
compromise. In this case, self-regulation was a preferred option, both because the
leading brokers were believed to know their business best, and because of the
unwillingness of the state to develop a sophisticated bureaucracy that would be
required to enforce prudential supervision on a reluctant market. Instead, a single
commissioner was appointed with a small staff and, as was the case for the first
banking legislation in 1947, his main role was limited to registration of members of
the market rather than pro-active supervision. Instead of regulation, the government
turned to consolidating the exchanges both in order to make it easier to perform
prudential supervision and in accordance with its underlying view that the market
was overcrowded by brokers. Their view was that this overcrowding threatened the
integrity of the entire system.
IV
There was considerable rivalry among the exchanges, particularly between the
HKSE and the FEE in its early days. There were also, however, strong forces for
unification after the end of the boom. By September 1975, in view of the low level
of business, it was agreed in principle that the exchanges should merge. At
the beginning of 1976, J. B. Selwyn, the securities commissioner, wrote to the
exchanges proposing that the way forward was to liquidate all existing exchanges
and create a new one with the total number of seats set at about 300. This reflected
his belief that the 1,000 brokers in business at the time were no longer supported by
business on the market.63 He suggested that the seats be allocated by inviting the top
500 brokers by size of turnover to bid for the 300 seats thus letting the market
determine the price ‘which is in conformity with the general atmosphere of
Hong Kong’. Some compensation would be paid to those who gave up their seats.
The exchanges, predictably, rejected this government initiative to reduce the
62 Fell, Crisis, pp. 44–6. Fell’s book is a personal account of his time as banking commissioner and
securities commissioner in Hong Kong.
63 Letter from J. B. Selwyn to Kam Ngan Stock Exchange, 15 January 1976. FEE Box 34/1.
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number of traders so dramatically. Instead, a complicated network of bilateral
negotiations began during 1977, a year which marked the lowest combined annual
turnover on the exchanges during the 1970s.
Talks between Zimmern (now head of the HKSE) and Ronald Li took place
secretly in March and April 1977. They met along with their deputies Mok Ying
Kie and K. Wong on 12 April 1977 to propose a Hong Kong and Far East Stock
Exchange Ltd with five council members from each and two co-chairs. This
suggests the merger was more cosmetic than fundamental. The exchanges would
communicate via CCTV, publish a single turnover figure and retain the Hang Seng
index. The plan was to be put informally to members of both exchanges in a month,
in time for an extraordinary general meeting to approve the proposals. Zimmern and
Li hoped to arrange a merger agreement between their two exchanges that would
then dominate the market and marginalise the smaller exchanges. But before their
talks could bear fruit the HKSE Committee disrupted the negotiations and
Zimmern resigned.64 Instead, the Committee of the HKSE chose to begin
negotiations with the KNE whose turnover was about the same as the HKSE, effec-
tively ending the FEE/HKSE initiative.65 On 26 April 1977, the same day as a press
release from the securities commissioner urged the four exchanges to set up
a merger working party, R. A. Witts, secretary and general manager of the HKSE
told Li that he had spoken to the KNE and suggested a three-way merger.66 The
next day, the KSE reported to the securities commissioner that it had also received
an invitation to consider merger from the HKSE.67 In August 1977 the HKSE
and the KNE were linked by closed-circuit TV to further integrate trading. Li
described two possible models for unification; beginning with a merger of two
exchanges that would then gradually absorb the others or the creation of a new
exchange that would absorb all four exchanges. He preferred the former option as
the easier path and, once rejected by the HKSE, approached the much smaller KSE,
whose main asset was its premises.68
In May 1977, Li was in separate discussions with Peter Chan of the KSE about a
possible merger.69 The deal proposed by the KSE was that the FEE would acquire
the KSE in return for 58 free seats for current KSE members. This represented one
free seat for every three existing KSE seats. Those KSE members not participating
would be compensated by $HK40,000 out of the sale of KSE assets. All companies
listed only on the KSE would be persuaded to move or traded on a special board. No
64 FEER, 96 no. 18, 6 May 1977, p. 60.
65 On 6 April, Woo Hon-fai, chair of the Kam Ngan Exchange, wrote to Li on hearing of the merger
talks between HKSE and FEE asking to be included. Letter from Woo Hon Fai to Li, 6 April 1977.
FEE Box 58/11.
66 Letter from R. A. Witts to R. Li, 26 April 1977. FEE box 58/11.
67 Letter from P. P. F. Chan, KSE, to Securities Commission, 27 April 1977. FEE Box 58/11.
68 Chairman’s Report, Far East Exchange Yearbook, 1977.
69 Letter from Peter P. F. Chan (KSE) to R. Li (FEE), 5 May 1977. FEE Box 10/6.
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committee members of the KSE were to seek any office on the committee of
the FEE, nor were the new seats transferable within three years in order to curb
speculative occupancy of seats. In addition, the new KSE members would only need
to put up $HK20,000 guarantee as opposed to the usual FEE guarantee of
$HK250,000. The FEE countered that the KSE should begin by selling all assets and
paying all the proceeds to the FEE in return for the 58 new FEE seats. The FEE
would then pay the compensation of $HK40,000 to non-participants.70 However, a
multilateral working party on merger was established later in May 1977, which
pre-empted these discussions. The correspondence, however, does suggest that
while trading on the KSE was generally moribund by 1977, its fixed assets meant that
it continued to be a player in the merger talks.
While the market continued to be in a slump, a working party was formed of two
representatives from each exchange in May 1977. Echoing the driving force behind
the market more generally, property and location were major considerations.
The Far Eastern Economic Review reported that the ‘Problems include physically
combining the variously-leased exchange premises, reducing the number of brokers,
and deciding how to compensate, from the exchanges’ quite substantial assets,
brokers that do not survive the thinning-out process.’71 The discussions turned into
wrangling as the market revived.
At the beginning of November 1977, the financial secretary made a public
statement to the Society of Accountants setting out the reasons for the unification
that suggested economies on both regulation and self-regulation. A single exchange
would be more economic to administer, have a higher calibre secretariat to govern
listing and disclosure, create a broader and less erratic market and make it easier to
enforce legislation. He also warned that, unless tangible progress was forthcoming,
he would legislate to achieve unification.72 At the end of November 1977, after six
months’ deliberations, the working party promised a draft Memorandum of Associa-
tion within two months. Peter Chan in the chair noted that ‘I think it is imperative
that we should convince the financial secretary that we are working as fast as we can
in order that the future unified stock exchange will not be controlled in any way by
the government.’73 A draft memo was duly sent to Haddon-Cave in January 1978
and the target date for unification was set for the beginning of 1980.
Still, there were delays and further negotiation. The market recovered in mid
1978 and then accelerated from the third quarter of 1979. In the year from October
1979 to October 1980 the Hang Seng Index doubled from 600–1200. This return to
prosperity reduced the incentive among the exchanges to merge and discussions
70 Letter R. Li to Peter P. F. Chan, FEE Box 10/6.
71 FEER, 29 Jul 1977, p. 50. These were also the obstacles described by Li in his chairman’s report, Far
East Exchange Yearbook 1977.
72 Letter from P. F. P. Chan to members of the Federation of Stock Exchanges, 8 November 1977.
FEE Box 111/3.
73 Meeting of the Working Party for Unification, 28 November 1977. FEE Box 111/3.
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became prolonged. Finally, having run out of patience, Haddon-Cave announced in
his 1980 budget speech that the government would create a single exchange by law,
and, in June 1980, the securities commissioner met with brokers to unveil the
government’s plans for an enforced merger. The rules for the unified exchange were
devised by the existing exchanges but then had to be agreed by the securities
commissioner before being passed into legislation. Brokers elected Woo Hon-fai,
head of the KNE, to chair the committee on unifying the exchanges.
The 1980 Stock Exchanges Unification Ordinance had a strict timetable for a
committee representing the four exchanges to select members and find premises
with the expectation that the new exchange would begin trading in 1983. The
inverse relationship between enthusiasm for reform and the level of activity in
the market, however, prolonged the negotiations for a further three years. This time
the reform was disrupted by a market boom and bust in 1980–2 that accompanied
a prolonged currency crisis and banking crisis that dragged on to 1986. A major
obstacle was satisfying existing members about the criteria for membership in the
new exchange and this was only finally resolved in August 1985.74 The new Stock
Exchange of Hong Kong (SEHK) finally began trading in May 1986 with 900
members (600 more than the government had initially proposed) and was formally
opened in October, just in time for the boom of 1986/7 that would bring about the
fall of Ronald Li.
A new era for the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong was launched after the October
1987 crash required the suspension of trading for four days. In this instance, Hong
Kong was mainly the victim of the global equities collapse, but the crash also
exposed the poor governance of the market and the illegal practices that had arisen
during the boom. Ronald Li, one of the most respected and influential participants
in the market and founder of the FEE, was arrested by the Independent Commission
Against Corruption in January 1988. He was convicted of soliciting and accepting
preferential shares in return for approving new listings, and served two and a
half years in prison.75 This episode led to reform of the exchange to strengthen the
regulatory framework and eliminate the ‘ethical laxity’ that had become endemic in
the market.76
In 1988 the Davison Report delivered its recommendations for the reform of the
SEHK in the wake of this scandal. It continued to promote self-regulation as the best
course for Hong Kong. The report argued that this system offered flexibility, that
the exchange had already ‘taken substantial steps to put their houses in order’, and
that modern securities markets were too complex for outsiders to supervise
effectively. The lack of skilled bureaucrats was noted as a particular impediment to
74 Fell, Crisis, pp. 48–54.
75 An account of the case is available on the ICAC website, www.icac.org.hk as one of the ICAC’s
landmark cases.
76 This phrase is attributed to Nicholas Goodison, chairman of the London Stock Exchange, on a visit
to Hong Kong in September 1987. Fell, Crisis, p. 224.
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state regulation.77 Instead, the external government watch-dog was strengthened
by the establishment of a new Securities and Futures Commission with a more
substantial staff and independent of government. The report also recommended that
day-to-day management of the exchange not be left to its members and that
professional managers should be introduced instead. The self-regulation was thus
moved one step away from the members themselves in an effort to reduce moral
hazard.
V
The case of the Hong Kong stock exchanges shows the problems inherent in relying
on self-regulation with inadequate external supervision. When the market was small
in the pre-war years and through the 1950s, the problems of insider trading
and other forms of malpractice did not attract the interest of the government.
Dominated by influential British expatriates, the HKSE operated an unregulated
monopoly with the spirit of a gentleman’s club for almost 25 years before
competition entered the market. However, the monopoly was restraining the
growth of the market by the late 1960s, as is evident in the explosion of business after
the three other exchanges opened for business. Self-regulation without supervision
in this highly competitive atmosphere made it much easier for companies to quote
on the exchange and so raise capital, but it also led to the bidding downward of
listing standards and the quality of brokers. Companies that did not meet the
requirements of one exchange could merely move on to another while the fees for
membership of the exchanges fell drastically. This generated costs for the stability
of the market and for unwary small-scale investors that eventually drew the govern-
ment in to constrain this competition by merging the exchanges. The monopoly
SEHK, however, became the victim of corruption because self-regulation was not
combined with effective external supervision and enforcement.
The weak supervisory structure for equity trading echoed the government’s
approach to the banking sector. As was the case for banking, it took a crisis and the
need to protect the public to prompt reluctant government intervention. In the case
of the banking system, the large and powerful banks persistently called for greater
external regulation that they hoped would create barriers to entry and would
eliminate excessively risky activities by smaller banks that threatened the stability of
the system as a whole. Unlike the case of the equity market, the large domestic banks
were advocates of state regulation and there were fewer opportunities for moral
hazard because of greater transparency, particularly in the international sector. The
large banks were conservative and risk-averse, while the leaders of the FEE, KSE
and KNE were not. In the case of the banks, self-regulation was eventually limited
to interest rates offered on deposits after 1965, while for the equity market the scope
was much wider.
77 Report of the Securities Review Committee (May 1988), ch. 3.
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A free-market approach would suggest that competition would naturally force
the weakest companies and corrupt brokers out of the market, but this proved to be
a costly process that even the bust of 1973 did not accomplish. The enthusiasm for
quick returns on a rising boom market proved to the state that some intervention
was required in order to protect the public. In the 1970s, however, state interven-
tion was uneven and became focused on constraining ‘excessive’ competition to
deliver stability. Consolidating the market by favouring larger participants promised
to discourage risky behaviour and make supervision easier. While in the 1960s the
government believed Hong Kong to be ‘over banked’, so in the 1970s the colony
was considered ‘over brokered’. Unlike the banks, brokers preferred self-regulation
to government control, but remained reluctant to introduce any reforms, particu-
larly when profits were high. Cooperation among the exchanges was greatest during
dull times in the market such as in the mid 1970s when the federation was formed
and negotiations took place to merge the exchanges. The weakness of the self-
regulating federation was exposed when it failed to enforce restrictions preventing
competition from overseas brokers. In the end, the individual interests of the
exchanges could not be reconciled and the government was forced to coerce them
to unify. A monopoly was thus restored to the new Stock Exchange of Hong Kong
but this quickly led to corruption when the gaps in the supervisory system allowed
the exchange to be undermined by bribery. The Davison Report charged that ‘an
inside group treated the Exchange as a private club’.78 This is very similar language
to the charges Li made against the HKSE, but the growth of equity trading meant
the consequences of this cosy environment were much greater in the 1980s than in
the 1960s.
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